# rco-10060.org — RCO-10060 · canonical text v1.1 RCO-10060 defines a signed receipt for a cleared read of a listed issuer's record. The receipt identifies the subject, the jurisdiction, the clearance rule, the stated time of the read and the hash of the signed answer supplied, and links that event into a verifiable receipt chain. The RCO door signs receipts under its own key; the producing node separately signs its content under the record key. A consumer verifies the receipt, matches the answer hash and verifies the record, and so holds attributable evidence of both the content and the read. RCO preserves the record of the read without holding the content or judging its truth. ## The contract RCO-10060 defines the Record of Cleared Orders: the signed evidence of a cleared read. Its unit of record is the answer supplied to an artificial-intelligence (AI) agent under an identified rule and jurisdiction at a stated time. One receipt is written for each cleared read, chained to the receipt before it, and verifiable by anyone against a published key without asking the operator. Record of Cleared Orders is the one expansion of RCO. The name is always accompanied by its definition, because the unit is the cleared read — the order of business an agent was cleared to proceed with — not a securities order. Every receipt makes the same promises, wherever in the family an agent encounters it: Subject. The receipt names what was read, by the subject's own identifier and type. Jurisdiction. The receipt names the market the read was cleared under. Rule. The receipt names the clearance rule and its revision, as owned by ACM-68000 (Agent Clearance Manifest). Time. The receipt states when the read was cleared, in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). Answer binding. The receipt carries the hash of the exact signed answer supplied. A valid receipt paired with a different answer is an answer-binding failure. Chain position. The receipt carries its sequence and the hash of its predecessor, so that any later alteration of history is detectable. Attribution. The receipt names the writer that cleared the read and carries a defined, non-identifying attribution of the caller. The purpose is to make the read inspectable after the interaction has ended. A firm preserves its receipts, compares them with the answers it retained, and verifies the signatures on its own machine, without depending on any review interface the operator controls. ## What the standard does not do It does not establish that an answer was true. The receipt is the door's attributable statement that a caller was supplied a specified answer under a stated rule at a stated time; the content's truth is the record's matter, under ECO-10060. It does not establish that a securities order was executed. An execution record is a separate record type, linked to the receipt it consumed, and is not defined here. It does not re-evaluate the rule or certify compliance. The clearing gate applies the rule; the door records the event. It does not hold the content. The door holds the receipt and the answer hash, not a copy of the record. Retention of full answer bytes is the firm's own responsibility or a separately described custody service. It does not hold personal data or amounts. The caller attribution is a defined hash or handle, empty when unknown; no price, balance or settlement amount is carried. Artificial intelligence makes mistakes. A receipt proves what the agent was told, not that what it was told was right. ## Who signs Two objects are signed in this family, by two keys, and neither key signs the other's object. The receipt is signed by the RCO door under the receipt key. Its public keys are published at the door's /.well-known/jwks.json, alongside the historical keys needed to verify retained history. This signature belongs to RCO-10060. The record the agent received is signed by the producing node under the record key, published at that node's /.well-known/jwks.json. That signature belongs to ECO-10060 and SM-ECO-10060. A complete check verifies two objects with two key sets and compares the answer hash between them: verify the receipt, hash the signed record actually received, match it to answer_hash, then verify the record against its node's key. The receipt proves the read; the record proves the content. Writing requires the authorised writer credential. Public verification confers no write access. Listing and statements require the firm's own scoped key; an auditor's key is limited to the slice the granting firm authorised. There is one authorised writing organisation for this chain — the holder of the standard, operating its own gates — which is not a limit on how many gates or processes may write. ## The arrow listed security → record (ECO-10060, the node) → market and duty (SM-ECO-10060, the chapter) → rule (ACM-68000) → whether (AIO-10060, the outcome) → where (AMP-10060, the venue) → receipt (RCO-10060, under every door) The receipt is the last object in the arrow and the only one that outlives the session. Every standard before it owns one thing the receipt carries: the record supplies the subject and the answer hash; SM-ECO-10060 supplies the market; ACM-68000 supplies the rule and its revision; AI Orderability (AIO), where it applies, supplies a structured outcome the answer contains. RCO-10060 owns the proof. ## The receipt Receipt version 1 carries fifteen fields. This text preserves their names and meaning; it adds none. Field | Type | Meaning | Req. v | string | Receipt specification version | yes id | string | Content-derived identifier of the receipt, carrying the rco: prefix | yes seq | integer | Position of the receipt in the chain | yes writer | string | The authorised gate that cleared the read, under the published writer mapping | yes caller | string | Defined caller attribution: a hash of the firm's key identifier or the payer's wallet handle; empty when unknown | yes subject | string | What was read, by its own identifier | yes subject_type | string | Kind of identifier in subject | yes market | string | Market the read was cleared under | yes rule_version | string | Clearance rule and its revision, as owned by ACM-68000 | yes cleared_at | datetime (UTC) | Stated time the read was cleared | yes answer_hash | string | Hash of the exact signed answer supplied | yes prev_hash | string | Hash of the preceding receipt; the defined genesis value for the first | yes hash | string | Hash of the receipt's canonical payload | yes sig | string | Ed25519 signature selected through kid | yes kid | string | Key identifier selecting the receipt key in the door's key set | yes subject_type classifies the identifier in subject and nothing else. A later profile that needs a disclosure class, a product scope or a client class carries it in a field of its own; no existing value is silently redefined. rule_version resolves to an immutable revision. A rule family name alone identifies which duty applied, not which revision governed the read; the published rule register carries the mapping from value to revision. Unknown fields present in a signed payload are part of what was signed. A verifier follows the version's signed-payload rules and never discards fields it does not interpret before hashing. ## Chain, time and custody Each receipt links to its predecessor through prev_hash. A chain walk checks the links, the sequence, the receipt hashes and the signatures. An isolated signature check establishes a valid object; it does not establish that every earlier or later receipt is present. Verification results say which of the two they establish. cleared_at is a signed assertion of event time. An independent timestamp supplies external evidence of when the committed data existed. The chain tip is submitted to public timestamp calendars on a fixed schedule; a submission and a completed timestamp proof are reported in their actual verification state, never conflated. The serving store is append-only: no credential, including the operator's, can update or delete a written receipt. Copies of every export and every anchored tip are written once, outside the serving platform, under a retention lock, with a credential that can write and cannot read, list or delete. A firm's receipts are also exported nightly to storage the firm controls. Historical receipts retain their original bytes, field names and verification rules. New keys and new versions never rewrite them. Key rotation keeps every historical public key available and records when each successor key took effect. For a customer-only export, gaps in seq are other customers' receipts, not missing rows. A signed monthly statement or export manifest is the operator's attributable claim of completeness for that slice; a stronger cryptographic proof of slice completeness is a separate mechanism, not implied by the chain. ## Verification A reference verifier works locally with supplied key material. Fetching keys and receipts is retrieval, not verification; keeping the two apart is what makes offline checks and reproducible tests possible. Determine the receipt version and obtain its published verification profile. Select the public key named by kid from the door's key set; reconstruct the payload under the profile; check hash and the derived id; verify sig. Hash the signed record actually received under the answer-byte profile; compare with answer_hash. Verify that record against the producing node's key; check its signed subject, market and node attribution against the receipt. For chain claims, check seq and prev_hash links from a trusted earlier position to an independently witnessed tip. Report failures precisely. No failure is converted into a cleared state. The specification and the reference verify() are published under the MIT licence. Adopting the receipt format confers no authority on the chain: a third party implements a verifier freely and becomes a writer only by the holder's grant. ## Doors Three surfaces, three roles, kept distinguishable even where they share generated content: the standard's page states the meaning; the door operates the service; the human door explains it. The door's tools, their authentication, and the exact hostnames are published by the door itself and read from it; this text names the roles, not the addresses. Retired hostnames follow a documented path. A browser redirect and a compatibility shim for machine clients are different mechanisms; routing follows the fleet registry and the door's actual transport behaviour, never the assumption that a redirect preserves every client call. ## Publication discipline One approved source. The standard's page and every machine file under it are generated from this text and the door's live facts. Nothing on a surface is typed by hand. Honest surfaces. The door's descriptor lists the tools it serves and what each needs. The standard's page is a reference surface and serves no tools. No counts, no money. No receipt total, agent total, price, balance or settlement figure appears in the standard's text or on its page. Versions kept apart. Standard version, receipt version, verification-profile version, rule revision and deployment version are distinguishable; a change to any of them carries a dated amendment. Receipt before page. No field is added to the receipt by page copy. A new field exists when its schema is ratified, its profile published and its test vectors pass. Machine: /.well-known/agent-card.json · /.well-known/security.txt · /rco.json Standard held by Allooloo Technologies Corp. · Open standard, MIT licence.